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Abstract
It is an ordinary day working from home, and you are part of a team that
regularly interacts over email. Since this is your main line of communication,
the company trained you to spot phishing emails. You’ve learned to skip over
emails that exhibit obvious phishing red flags: suspicious links, attachments,
grammar errors, etc. You just received an email from your boss about a major
project on which you play a critical role. The email is more demanding than
usual, even impolite. Your boss has generally seemed more upset with you
lately, so you approach them to express your concerns and clear the air. Your
boss is not receptive to your feedback. This causes a rift that impacts your
working relationship, compromising the effectiveness and productivity of the
entire team. You have been a victim of an Ambient Tactical Deception (ATD)
attack. We developed and tested a proof-of-concept social engineering attack
targeting web-based email users. The attack is executed through a malicious
browser extension that acts as a man-in-the-middle and reformats the textual
content to alter the emotional tone of the email. The objective of ATD is not
stealing credentials or data. ATD seeks to coerce a user to the attacker’s desired
behavior via the subtle manipulation of trusted interpersonal relationships. This
goes beyond simple phishing and this paper reports the findings from study that
investigated an ATD attack on the politeness strategy used in work emails.
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1. Introduction
Modern workplaces focus on winning the employees’ loyalty by allowing flex-
ible hours and working from home, among other things [1]. Many companies
have scattered teams working remotely. The lack of shared office space reduces
the face-to-face communication, heightening the use of email or other types of
online communication [2]. Reciprocity and other forms of conditional cooper-
ation are still at stake in formal settings, however, now employees have the
option to use asynchronous mode (email) in addition to synchronous mode of
communication (face-to-race, telephone, or instant messaging). Asynchronous
messages, like email, are of particular interest for social engineering because
they avoid most of the nonverbal cues that reveal malicious intentions [3]. No
wonder that more than 50% of the overall email traffic is spam and phishing [4].
Phishers try to cooperate with their potential victims and gain their com-
pliance to yield their credentials, install malicious software, or send money [5].
People and employees dependent on email communication learned to spot phish-
ing emails. Emails are now routinely checked for sender’s email address, a digital
signature, grammar errors, suspicious links and attachments, any kind of un-
warranted urgency for taking action [6]. What if all of this is intact? Is there
still a room for social engineering through emails? We believe there is, if the
attacker phishes not for what the email receiver has (e.g. credentials, system
permissions, or money), but instead what they perceive, think, or feel. We call
this new type of social engineering Ambient Tactical Deception (ATD).
In the physical world, tactical deception refers to the ”misrepresentation of
the state of the world to another individual and it allows adversaries to ex-
ploit conditional cooperation by tactically misrepresenting their intentions” [7].
Attackers can bring the tactical deception in the cyber world as the phish-
ers did through email communication 24 years ago [8]. To remain undetected,
attackers have to reside in the computing ambience, e.g. the trusted commu-
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nication interfaces for routing information exchange online [9]. This is quite
different than traditional phishing - the ATD attacker is not the sender but the
man-in-the-middle. The social engineering objective is different too - instead of
impersonating the sender, the ATD attacker uses an already established condi-
tional cooperation the sender has with the receiver and silently manipulates the
textual content exchanged. The ATD attackers are not phishers per se; their
intention is not to steal but rather to make people (un)happy with a person, a
project, or an event. To the same objectives, although through different means,
we have already witnessed adversaries during the 2016 US presidential elections
and the Brexit campaign [10], [11].
In the next section, we are introducing the concept and the technical imple-
mentation of the ATD attack together with the threat model and the most likely
victims. In section 3 we discuss the results from a study where we investigated
the plausibility of the ATD attack. Section 4 provides an analytical comparison
between the ATD and the conventional social engineering exploits to highlight
the transition into a post-phishing era of human manipulation online. In Sec-
tion 5 we conceptualize a defense-in-depth prototype to counter ATD attacks.
This is a promising way to protect against this sort of cyberattack that also has
innovative properties beneficial beyond the realm of cybersecurity alone. We
conclude the paper in Section 6 discussing the evolution of ATD.
2. Ambient Tactical Deception
2.1. Concept
An attacker can use malicious software to act as a man-in-the-middle in
online communication, particularly in exchanging information through a web
browser. Instead of merely ”listening,” to the data that flows between two peo-
ple, they can induce misperception. We call this new form of exploit Ambient
Tactical Deception (ATD). Ambient, because the malware-based extension al-
lows the user to routinely complete their web tasks without considering any
changes in the interface. Tactical deception, because the attacker silently alters
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a ”honest” content (e.g. email, social media post, or a website) to misrepre-
sent the state of the world to another individual. ATD, in cybersecurity terms,
targets the integrity of the communication content.
An ATD attack works in several steps as shown in Figure 1. In the first step,
the attacker employs legitimacy-by-design (legitimate both in visual design and
in meeting what the user expects to see from a legitimate application) to per-
suade a victim to install a benign web browser extension for a standard utility
that requires text manipulation permissions from the user (Sticky Notes, for
example). The attacker bets on the fact that roughly 17% of users pay atten-
tion to permissions during installation and only 3% understand how permissions
correspond to security risks [12]. The ATD attacker phishes for victim’s system
permissions, but not to exfiltrate data, install ransomware, or cause any par-
ticular damage to their system. ATD works because developing extensions for
browsers like Chrome or Mozilla is free and a benign extension can pass all the
security checks before publishing. ATD also exploits the browsers are already
trusted applications and most antivirus products give it a free pass.
"Stickies" 
requests 
permissions 
to modify text
The adversary lures the victim to install a benign 
browser extension for sticky notes, i.e. "Stickies" 
AdversaryTarget User
The adversary dynamically changes the "Stickies" 
extension to covertly add the ATD malware
The victim accesses a web-based email, 
social media post, or a website 
ATD malware: alters the email text, social media 
post, or a web page presented in the browser 
without the knowledge of the victim or any of 
the communication parties 
The victim grants the permissions
Figure 1: The ATD Attack Flowchart.
In the second step, the attacker changes the behavior of the extension dy-
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namically and uses the previously issued permissions to manipulate any text
as part of the ATD attack. It is important to note that text is only changed
as means to manipulate the tone but not the facts. ATD works insofar as the
original text remains clear so as not to raise red flags, and the shift in tone still
opens the opportunity for subtle coercion.
2.2. Implementation
The ATD extension, written in JavaScript, changes the tone of textual con-
tent by inserting, rearranging and/or swapping words with synonyms detected
on a web page. The extension parses out the HMTL for predefined words or word
patterns and renders a version of the HTML with the targeted swap or word
rearrangement. An example application of ATD is shown in Figure 2a (ATD
extension ”off”) and Figure 2b (ATD extension ”on”) swapping ”disagree” with
”strongly oppose him” and ”love” with ”hold dear” in a public Twitter post
[13]. The victim has no reason to question the legitimacy of the tweet because
it comes form a trusted source.
(a) ATD extension ”off” (b) ATD extension ”on”
Figure 2: Dynamic manipulation of text in a social media post with the ATD extension
Borrowing from Orwell’s Politics and the English Language, the simple idea
for the ATD alternation in this example is to make the original message sound
less direct and lessen its effect - countering the principle of political writing to
”never use a long word or metaphor where a short one will do. [14]” An ATD
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attacker interested in meddling with political Twitter messaging can use, for
example, the The New American Lexicon playbook or jargon characteristic of
pecific political party [15]. Altering words does indeed affect an individual’s
perception of political messaging - a study measuring trends in the partisanship
of congressional speech found that it is fairly easy for an observer to infer a
congressperson’s party from a single utterance [16].
We didn’t take this route for our study and instead focused on email requests
in formal settings. One of the motivations was the peculiar incident with John
Podesta, Hillary Clinton’s campaign chef, where a Russian hacking group was
able to retrieve a decade of his emails [17]. He received a phishing email claiming
that hackers had tried to infiltrate his Gmail account, and sender provided
a link to reset his password. Suspicious of potential phishing, he rightfully
forwarded the email to the IT staff for further investigation. But then their reply
contained a typo: it said the email was ”legitimate” (instead of ”illegitimate”)
so Podesta should proceed to change the password (and with that, to reveal
his new password to the hacking group). Carrying out an email request in
formal settings, like a political campaign headquarters, can have devastating
results. We believe that after this incident there is a lot of protection against
phishing attacks. But what if an attacker intentionally plants typos not to steal
information but to change attitudes and perceptions?
2.3. Attacker’s Profile
An ATD attack could be specifically targeted to an individual and most
of our examples take that perspective. However, ATD is a variable tactic and
would likely be more successful if employed by an individual or group who wished
to in some way disrupt another group, a company, or a team of people. Our
background research showed that it is much easier to make communication more
negative than it is to make communication more positive [citation redacted].
This works to the advantage of an attacker who wants to make people unhappy
with a person, a project, or a company. The attacker(s) would want to create
discord within a group, and might employ ATD as part of a larger effort. It
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could be used to slow down a competitor, poach disgruntled workers, or turn
some parts of a group against a specific leader.
2.4. Threat Model and Victims
The ATD attacks originally stem from efforts in which social networks were
used to distribute deceptive material through ads and target people of interest.
The most infamous example is with Cambridge Analytica, a political data firm,
gained access to private information on more than 87 million Facebook users
[10]. The firm then offered tools to interested parties that could identify the
personalities of voters and influence their political opinion [18]. Another similar
case for ad-based ATD attack was when the UK Labour Party campaign chiefs
believed that digital ads requested by party leader Jeremy Corbyn were too
expensive. Instead, they ran the ads so that only Corbyn and his team would
see them, using ”individually-targeted, hyper-specific ads through Facebook”
[11]. Outside of the political arena, a company called Spinner helps customers
manipulate their loved ones with a variety of ads aiming to ”boost their intimate
life, quit their jobs, or buy their kids a dog” [19].
A malware-based ATD variant is less costly, can target technologies beyond
social network platforms, and can have a bigger impact (more granular mi-
crotargeting, for example, where the ATD is invoked for a person of interest).
We focused on developing a malware-based browser extension because they are
low-tech and require minimal investment. In general, the ATD attacks do not
need to be approached as a browser extension. A malicious actor may achieve
a man-in-the-middle advantage over a victim through a malware for desktop,
mobile-email clients, or as an insider threat. For example, the ATD attack can
be executed using the LightNeuron malware which allows the attacker to read
and modify any email passing through a compromised mail server [20]. Another
attack vector for ATD might be a variant of a keylogger/spelling software.
The ATD malware, if deployed successfully, is independent of the email
sender, social media account, or webpage source, the protections in the commu-
nication, and the specificity of the textual content. The most likely victims of
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ambient tactical deception are ”users that have abandoned traditional interme-
diaries,” such as newspapers and other sources that include editorial judgement
of the information provided [21]. Any relationship in which people rely on web
browsers for email correspondence and online communication would be good
ATD targets. It is estimated that one in five Americans communicates excul-
sively online [22].
2.5. System Security Exploit
ATD compromises the system security or on both system and application
level. On a system level ATD compromises the access control - it uses permis-
sions to manipulate text that was granted by the targeted user for a seemingly
bogus application. On an application level, ATD acts as a man-in-the-middle
exploit that targets the integrity of a message (social media post, email, web
page). Based on the on impersonation technique, ATD can be classified as a
spoofing-based man-in-the-middle attack [23]. This is an attack in which the at-
tacker intercepts a legitimate communication between two hosts by the means of
a spoofing attack, and controls transferred data, while hosts are not aware of a
middle man existence. The ”middle man” ATD is the malware-based extension:
it intercepts a legitimate HTML document between a legitimate server and a
target user right before it is rendered in the browser window, and dynamically
controls how the target user views the text when looking at the social media
post, web page, or email.
3. Ambient Tactical Deception in Formal Email Requests: A Study
3.1. Politness in Formal Emails
Email communication is asynchronous, limits emotional inference (some-
times requires emojis), and allows senders to plan and revise messages for
grammar, mechanics, clarity, and politeness [24]. This makes email a highly
preferable vector for a malware-based ATD attack. Our initial focus is on po-
liteness in email because it is a critical component of human communication
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and personal discourse, especially in formal settings [25]. The theory of polite-
ness suggests that people use various politeness strategies to mitigate any face
threatening acts when they initiate requests (any acts, including written text,
which in some way threaten the ’face’ or self-esteem, autonomy, or freedom of
another person) [26]. There are four strategies in doing so, ordered from least
to most polite (the budget request email examples are added for illustration):
• Bald-on-record - a way of speaking that is clear, direct, and concise, e.g.
”We need a budget, now!”
• Positive politeness - a redress directed to the recipient’s desire to be
liked, appreciated, approved, e.g. ”Jake, we need a budget. Let’s finalize
it for the proposal today?”
• Negative politeness - a redress directed to the recipient’s desire to not
to be imposed upon, intruded, or otherwise put upon e.g. ”Jake, I know
you are busy, but would you be willing to meet with me for just an hour?
We need a budget for the proposal - the deadline is today.”
• Off-record - the receiver is given full autonomy to decide how to act
upon the request. For example, a sender writing: ”Proposals that include
budgets are more likely to receive funding” tries to implicitly note to the
receiver that they need a budget to submit a complete proposal.
According to the theory of politeness, the requestor or email sender considers
three factors when choosing a politeness strategy to craft a request:
• Degree of imposition - ranking of impositions by the degree to which they
are considered to interfere with one’s self-determination or approval
• Power of the receiver over the requestor - the degree to which the receiver
can impose his/her own plans at the expense of the sender’s plans
• Social distance between the receiver and the requestor - usually the fre-
quency and type of interaction between them (or how close they are)
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We chose to work with email discourse in formal settings for several reasons.
A case study of politeness in formal settings found that the aforementioned
strategies have been largely employed in the Enron email corpus [27]. Further,
a receiver in a formal setting is willing to carry out an email request. This is
important to eliminate cases where a receiver discards a request as irrelevant,
which is the crucial difference between ATD and traditional phishing emails.
An analysis of the email responsiveness of the Enron email corpus suggests that
receivers are willing to carry requests in formal settings and with a response
generated within a short period of time [28]. Additionally, a receiver in formal
settings can easily verify the sender’s email address. The social engineering
research shows that the sender’s email address verification is one of the main
cues in deciding the legitimacy of an email [29], [30], [31]. This is important
because the emails in the ATD form of social engineering are in fact coming
from legitimate senders (colleagues in the workplace), which allows the ATD
extension to work on the direct route of persuasion when manipulating the
politeness strategy used in a formal email request (see Section 4).
3.2. Study Design
We conducted a preliminary phenomenological study where the malware-
based ATD browser extension was used to alter an email request in formal
settings. Our objective was to investigate the plausibility of ATD as a new type
of social engineering exploit. A convenience sample of 36 participants agreed to
participate in the study [32]. The inclusion criteria required participants to be
18 years old or above, to have at least one year of experience working in formal
settings and communicating over email, and be a native English speaker (the
ATD was developed to alter text written in English language and the theory of
politeness pertains to western, english speaking cultures [27]). The study was
advertised as a ”study in email effectiveness in a workplace” to prevent any
influence the full knowledge about the ATD attack might have on the partici-
pants’ response. The research involved minimal risk, was approved by the IRB,
and the participants were debriefed on the overall study immediately after they
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provided their response.
Each participant was asked to imagine an email discourse between colleagues
in formal settings. Each participant was presented a screen of the Chrome
browser in a Windows operating system, and a Web Outlook client already
opened in the browser. First, the participant was presented an email request
with a bald-on politeness strategy as shown in Figure 3. After reading this
email, each participant was asked to verbally answer the following questions:
• What, in your opinion, is the degree of imposition in the email?
• What, in your opinion, is the power distance between the email sender
and receiver?
• What, in your opinion, is the social distance between the email sender and
receiver?
Figure 3: The email with a bald-on politeness strategy.
Next, each participant was shown a second email request, which was al-
tered by the ATD browser extension to employ a negative politeness strategy
as shown in Figure 4. Finally, the participants were again asked to answer the
three questions above relative to the second email request, The verbal answers
were recorded, transcribed, and coded for later analysis. We choose to work
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with interview-style data collection to enable the participants to elaborate their
choice. The participation took less than 30 minutes.
Figure 4: The email with a negative politeness strategy.
The email request we used was from a sidneyt@company.com email address,
contained only grammatically correct textual content, without links, attach-
ments images, or emojis, so the participants were able to legitimacy of the email.
We crafted the email request to contain a neutral phrase, for example ”We need
a budget”. This was important so the participants are able to recognize the
literal meaning of the request in the first place [33].
We choose the bold-on-record and the negative politeness strategy because
they are the least and the most polite in a direct way (the off-the-record strategy
is actually the most polite but it can introduce ambiguity given that it is left
to the receiver to interpret the content; we wanted to avoid this). For full
realization of the ATD attack, the malicious extension extracted the key request
phrases ”we need budget”, ”proposal,” ”deadline,” and ”now,” from the first
email and rearrange the remaining content of the email to read as if it was
written with a negative politeness strategy.
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3.3. Results
The results are summarized in Table 1. The answers on the first question
are coded as ”The degree of imposition in the first email is small/large”, on the
second as ”The sender has less/more/equal power than the receiver”, and on
the third as ”The sender and the receiver are very close/close/distant” [33].
Table 1: ATD Study Results
Politeness Factor Email 1 Email 2 Responses
degree of imposition small large 32
large large 4
power distance more less 22
more equal 7
more more 4
less less 3
social distance very close very close 2
very close close 16
very close distant 6
close very close 4
close distant 3
distant close 4
distant distant 1
89% of the participants reported a change in the degree of imposition and
social distance between the sender and the receiver between both emails. For the
degree of imposition, the overwhelming perception was that the sender in the
first email sounded ”very direct”, while in the second email the sender changed
the tone ”by mincing words” so ”to be more considerate of the effort needed by
the receiver.” Interestingly, four participants perceived no change in the degree
of imposition, reporting that ”the receiver has to send a budget by the end of
the day in any case, regardless of how the email sounds.”
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A smaller percentage, 80.55%, notice a change in the power distance - 22
reporting that the sender has more power in the first email while the receiver is
the one that has more power in the second email (seven reported that the sender
and the receiver are equal in power in the second email). Four participants
reported that in both emails, the sender has more power of the receiver, stating
that ”the email is probably sent by a boss”. Three participants reported that the
sender has less power in both emails, stating that ”the sender needs something
from the receiver”.
The social distance between the sender and the receiver increased in 69.45%
of the responses between the first and the second email (either from very close to
close, very close to distant, or close to distant). The social distance between the
first and the second email decreased for 22.23% of the responses (close to very
close and distant to close). Only 8.32% of the responses reported no change
in the social distance between the sender and the receiver in both emails (3
participants). The perception for very close sender and receiver was that they
are ”casual, probably know each other very well to communicate like that”. The
perception for close sender and receiver seem that they are ”somewhat friendly
at work and they at least know each other”. The perception for largest social
distance was that the sender and the receiver are ”distant and more formal.”
3.4. Plausibility of Ambient Tactical Deception in Formal Emails
Our main objective in this study was to investigate whether an ATD attack
manipulating the politeness strategy used to craft a formal email is a plausible
new form of social engineering. Specifically, we wanted to know if the percep-
tion on the three factors used to access politeness - the degree of imposition,
power distance, and social distance - will change if the ATD extension alters
the politeness strategy in a formal email request. Overall, 89% of the partici-
pants reporting change in the degree of imposition, 68.75% change in the power
distance, and 69.45% change in social distance.
The general impression is that ATD is in fact a plausible new type of social
engineering exploit with a huge potential for practical realization. The high
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percentage of reported change in perception of the degree of imposition indicates
that an ATD attacker can create an implicated context of formal domination
over a victim. Not everybody in a formal setting becomes victim to a social
engineering attack, however, and this holds true also for the ATD attack - four
participants reported no change on how they are implied in the context of the
task (”a budget has to be delivered by the end of the day in any case, regardless
on how the email sounds”).
Similarly, but to a larger account, 14 participants reported no change in
the perception of power distance between the sender and the receiver. Seven
reported that they are equal, four that the sender has more power, and three that
the sender has less power than the receiver between the two emails. One reason
might be the choice of the formal setting for the study. Another reason might
be the generational differences and the reported years of experience working in
formal settings (M = 8.027, SD = 6.669). These remarks hold true in general
for the perception on the social distance between the sender and the receiver.
In this case, the dominant impression was that the social distance increased (to
a variable degree) between the two emails in 25 of the responses, decreased in 8
of the responses, and it remained unchanged in only 3 of the responses.
It is important to keep in mind that these findings may, or may not, illustrate
that the the silent alternation of the politeness strategy is the sole factor con-
tributing to the overall change of perception. It way very well be that the ATD
acted as a behavioral intervention, or a ”nudge”, in the cybersecurity behavior
[34], not to promote a best behavior practice, but rather to ”socially engineer”
a behavior to the objective of the ATD attacker. Other factors, including the
study design, the content of the email, or the choice of politeness strategies,
may have contributed in the what participants reported about the politeness
factors in both emails. We take these cautions when analyzing these results and
they should be seen as initial support of our idea to investigate the plausibility
of ATD attacks rather than an authoritative test.
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4. The Post-Phishing Era of Social Engineering
4.1. ATD and Social Engineering Theory
”Social engineering seeks to persuade people or gain a victim’s compliance”
[5]. The ATD attack works the persuasion through a silent, man-in-the-middle
manipulation of text exchanged between two parties. The crucial difference in
the ATD attacks is that the attacker is not ”phishing” for a one-shot compliance
but for a continuous compliance; the gain is not what the victim has, rather,
the gain is what the victim perceives. Unlike the traditional phishing, the ATD
actually wants the victim to be engaged instead of mindlessly responding to a
request. The twist with ATD is that this engagement must not cross the de-
ception judgment threshold, otherwise the victim will ”temporarily abandon the
truth-default approach to seemingly legitimate emails, scrutinize the content,
and cognitively retrieve and/or seek evidence to assess honesty-deceit” [11]. The
truth-default theory suggest that people presume others to be honest because
they either don’t think of deception as a possibility during communicating or
because there is insufficient evidence lending them unable to prove they are
being deceived [11].
According to the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM), social engineering
utilizes the ”peripheral route” of persuasion to successfully engage the victim
[35] The ELM distinguishes ”central” from ”peripheral” routes of persuasion,
where a central route encourages an elaborative analysis of a message’s content,
and a peripheral one is a form of persuasion that does not encourage elaboration
(i.e. extensive cognitive analysis) of the message content. Rather, it solicits
acceptance of a message based on some adjunct element, such as perceived
credibility, likeability, or attractiveness of the message sender, or ”a catchy”
phrase or slogan. Quite the opposite then the traditional social engineering, the
ATD utilizes the central route to encourage the victim to elaborately analyze
the message’s content. In our preliminary study, the ”victim” was encouraged to
analyze three politeness factors in the email message: the degree of imposition,
the power of the sender over the sender, and the social distance between them.
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The social engineering theory resulted from testing six hypotheses to iden-
tify the traditional social engineering behavior [36]. The theory posits that
people with higher normative commitment, continuance commitment, affective
commitment, trust, obedience, and reactance succumb more frequently to social
engineering attacks. Normative commitment comes from a reciprocal exchange
with a target, where someone will expend effort and perform actions because
it is customary or is obligatory. In ATD attacks, the normative commitment
doesn’t take the form of typical ”give-and-take” in phishing email victims be-
cause the victims are not obliged for reciprocal exchange. Rather, the objective
of ATD is to induce a context of discourse to the objective of the attacker. For
example, in our study of altering politeness strategies, the victims have been
asked to provide a budget (which was their part of the job) by the end of the
day. All subjects stated they will provide the budget if in the position, but
when the email was more polite most of the subjects felt they have more power
over the requestor (instead of less power, which was reported for an email with
a less polite strategy).
ATD attacks are more related to the victims’ continuance and affective com-
mitment. With continuance commitment, people become psychologically vested
in a decision they have made and maintain consistency in behaviors related to
it [35]. So, in case of the workplace ATD tested in our study, victims are willing
to comply with email requests coming from verifiable work addresses. The ob-
jective of the ATD attack is to engineer the victims to psychologically vest into
behavior of the choice of the attacker by manipulating the politeness strategy
in an email, without the knowledge of the sender. For example, if a victim feels
the sender of an email has a bigger power than them, they might continuously
prioritize any email request sent by them. In the same manner, ATD can en-
gineer the victims to psychologically attach to others by manipulating whom
they like and identify with. Using our study as an example, the ATD attack
was successful in changing the perception on the social distance between the
sender and the receiver, which leads to affective commitment [37].
ATD attacks rely heavily on trust. Trust brings cognitive comfort that
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limits variety of thought and action and attentiveness to detail” [38]. The
ATD attack, unlike phishing, provides cognitive comfort to a degree that is
necessary to ”nudge” the victim to think about the context of a discourse or
a request instead of the content. For example, the ATD victims can verify
the sender (email address, no attachments, mutual workflow, etc.) but might
wonder whether the became distant with the sender if they address them with
more polite emails all of a sudden. Of course, victims can be under-trusting and
any such a change might trigger the deception judgment threshold, in which case
the ATD attacker needs to race to change a strategy of politeness before it is
fully detected.
However, some aspects from the obedience to authority theory can counter
the potential of under-trusting victims uncovering the ATD attack. Obedience
creates actions in deference to those who have perceived coercive power [39].
The ATD itself doesn’t create a perception of coercive power, but simply power
of compliance. Victims, especially in workplaces, obey commands or requests to
simply avoid a negative consequence such as disciplinary action (no one wants
to ”drop the ball”). As such, the ATD attacker can also play on the reactance
of the victim, acting on a scarcity item such as time. In our study the ATD
alternated the emails to demand budget from the receiver either by the ”end
of the day” (more polite) or ”now because the deadline the budget is needed is
today” (less polite). The less polite variant induced perception of higher power
of the sender prompting the subjects to feel that the request ”is big” and ”the
receiver better get that budget done”.
4.2. ATD in Social Engineering Taxonomy
The advanced social engineering taxonomy places the attacks in three cat-
egories: channel, operator, and type [2]. From the channels, ATD certainly
can be conveyed through websites and emails, but also social networks (when
accessed through the web). Web extensions targeting particular functional al-
ternation of social networks like Facebook have been developed in the past [40],
[41]. Simply by modifying the alternation to focus on the content rather than
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certain features (number of likes, dates of posts, etc), ATD can be employed
though the social network channel.
Operators in the taxonomy can be either humans or software. ATD clearly
belongs to the later given it is delivered through a malware-based web browser
extension. Software operators in this taxonomy are brought because of their
advantage in automating attacks and reaching within a short period of time to
a considerably higher number of victims than with purely human attacks. The
ATD attacks indeed are automated but not for the purpose of reaching to many
victims (thought possible), rather, the ATD attacks are automated to micro-
target specific victims and work in the context of personal discourse or tailored
web content narrative.
The proposed taxonomy recognizes four types of social engineering attacks:
physical, technical, social, and socio-technical. ATD is a new type of a social
engineering exploit that is socio-technical in nature, but not as described in
the taxonomy. Phishing is identified as one of the most common combination
of social and technical approaches, emphasizing spear-phishing campaigns an
advanced, more sophisticated version. In spear-phishing, the attacker creates
highly targeted messages carried out after initial data-mining about a victim.
They point an example where social networking sites were mined on students
and then a message was sent that looked like it had been sent by one of their
friends. While ATD certainly can use data mining to fine tune the manipulation
of politeness strategies, it does so to learn not to make ”look-a-like” changes
but to make sure the victim doesn’t cross the deception judgment threshold.
The social component in ATD is the trust and the footprint of a relationship
established in a workplace or an assumed credibility of a technology.
5. ATD Detection and Prevention
5.1. Detection
As described in this paper, ATD is highly likely to elude a conventional
automatic security detection for several reasons. First, ATD operates on the
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HTML textual content after all of the email protections (e.g. digital signatures,
end-to-end encryption, or provider-enabled encryption) have been checked and
verified on the victim’s computer and in their web browser. Second, any opera-
tional security monitoring like intrusion or anomaly detection is focused on data
exfiltration or patterns of unusual traffic. ATD is not trying to exfiltrate any
data but to infiltrate in a subtle way and change the usual data exchanged in a
workplace. Third, the ATD attacker can always revert back to the bogus func-
tionality of the browser extension if they suspect that a vulnerability scanning
or a forensic investigation is taking place.
5.2. Defense - Conceptual Prototype
This and our previous paper focused on ATD intended to point out what we
believe is a possible attack vector against individuals and groups that has not
yet emerged in the wild, but that has analogs in other deception and information
warfare contexts [42]. We believe that the threat of ambient tactical deception is
an inherent risk of computer-mediated communication, particularly as artificial
intelligence and machine learning enable software to parse and edit text toward
particular emotional tone. We have focused on linguistic politeness as one vector
of changing communication without detection. As part of this effort, and the
high likelihood that ATD eludes conventional automatic security detection, we
considered how such attacks might be defended against. Our prototype for ATD
defense is based on a layered protection approach. The prototype is developed
in such a manner that each defensive technique interlocks with and supports all
the others [43].
5.3. Education and Training
As with any information warfare tactic, awareness of the potential of attack
is an advantage to the defender. We assume most people are aware that the
words they type move across computer networks, but we question whether much
thought is put into how easily those words might be changed along the way. We
have pointed out one low cost method of gaining a man-in-the-middle advantage
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and changing how an email reader may perceive the linguistic politeness of an
email sender. We do not believe the threat of such an attack is imminent, but
that those who consider computer and network security should be aware that
artificial intelligence and machine learning can be applied to social engineering
in ways that would previously have seemed like science fiction.
A practical training session for detecting ATD revolves around crossing the
deception judgment threshold and scrutinizing the email communication. The
traditional phishing training is focused on quick visual assessments for the most
reliable indicators like URLs, grammar, padlocks for https, links, and attach-
ments. As we suggested in the abstract, this is already in place for ATD. The
focus for the ATD training is thus on the analysis of the email content in the con-
text of interpersonal communication. One size won’t fit all because the degree
of imposition, power, and social distance might change over time.
However, the deception judgment can be calibrated based on how polite
someone has been in previous emails to set expectations for the ongoing and fu-
ture email discourse. Compared to the traditional social engineering victims, the
ATD ones have the advantage to actually approach (call, text, meet) the email
sender and confront about potential change in the tone of the email discourse
(or discuss the senders’ behaviors with other colleagues). This, in our opinion,
is an empowering strategy, and we suggest that any ATD training includes out-
of-band email verification. Certainly, this might make the formal interaction
cumbersome and redundant, but that is a very small price to quickly cross the
deception judgment threshold.
5.4. Linguistic Politeness Check
Since linguistic politeness follows patterns [26], [25], it should be possible
to develop software that checks the linguistic politeness of incoming and out-
going email. Whether it is possible to do so effectively is beyond the scope of
this paper, but we can imagine a rudimentary prototype that searches for and
points out linguistic politeness with a basic scale of the least polite (bold-on-
record) to the most polite (off-the-record) strategy. Employed as a browser or
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email software extension, it would serve as a data visualization supporting or
contradicting a user’s perception of the tone of the email. At minimum, this
would assist users in triggering the deception judgment. However, there are
some obvious problems with implementation as a browser extension, notably
a race condition with the ATD extension. If two or more extensions use the
textual content the same page, only one wins, and that can result in many cases
where the ATD will work but the linguistic politeness check will not (or vice
versa).
5.5. Individual Sensitivity Footprint (ISF)
An idiolect is the ”totality of the possible utterances of one speaker at one
time in using a language to interact with one other speaker” [44]. Forensic
authorship attribution, a sub-field of forensic linguistics, ”is the process in which
linguists set out to identify the author(s) of disputed texts using identifiable
features of linguistic style, ranging from word frequencies to preferred syntactic
structures.” [45]. Researchers have already attempted to identify email authors
using idiolect properties of their sentence structures by studying the Enron email
corpus [46].
Identifying a change in linguistic politeness requires a measurement of ex-
isting linguistic politeness: how polite someone has been in email previously
sets expectations for how polite others expect them to be. We have developed
a hypothetical measurement and named it an Individual Sensitivity Footprint
(ISF). As part of a conceptual prototype we explored how this measurement
might be used to screen for an ATD attack. Based on the work in [46] and
[45], we have propose a hypothetical measurement and named it an Individual
Sensitivity Footprint (ISF). As part of a conceptual prototype we posit that
this measurement might be used to screen for an ATD attack, especially in the
formal settings where we established the plausibility for such social engineering.
An ISF is a measurement of a focused idiolect, an individual’s unique way
of communicating as it relates to their linguistic politeness habits. A prototype
software could employ corpus approaches to an individual’s past email, as in
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[46], but focused on linguistic politeness structures. This software, analogous to
an anti-virus or anti-malware protection would scan incoming email for linguistic
politeness, and then compare the use of each individual’s linguistic politeness
against their previously established ISF. While a person may vary their linguistic
politeness depending on the situation, repeated derivation from an established
ISF would indicate a change, and possibly an ATD attack. An ISF-based defense
would alert the person who received the email that the sender’s ISF profile
indicates that the current email is either more or less polite than expected.
This software would have advantages beyond ATD defense, and could also be
used by an email sender to ensure they are not being rude, or that they do
not seem manipulative. In a team situation, an ISF-based system could allow
managers to monitor the tone of group communication, and the atmosphere it
creates.
6. Conclusion and Discussion
In this paper we presented the findings on a new type of social engineering
attack that we baptized as Ambient Tactical Deception or ATD. ATD works
though a malicious intermediary - a web browser extension, email exchange
malware, or malicious application - to manipulate a textual content exchanged
between two parties online. The objective is not to merely listen (and compro-
mise the confidentiality, like in traditional phishing) but to change the tone of
the messages, for example emails (compromise integrity). Not stealing creden-
tials by manipulating behavior is an objective attackers so far accomplished by
microtargeted ads or internet trolling. In the aftermath of the election meddling
and Brexit, we believe that attackers will likely try to use another vector for the
same objective. Email is a great candidate because conveys sound and direct
communication and as such allows deception that withstands the potential of
scrutiny of the content.
We tested and confirmed the plausibility of the ATD attack in formal email
communication where the attacker, acting in a man-in-the-middle fashion (not
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as the sender) alters the linguistic politeness in a single email to manipulate
the perception of the receiver on three factors: the degree of imposition, the
power distance, and the social distance between the sender and the receiver.
To counter ATD attacks in formal settings, we propose a conceptual defense-in-
depth prototype that includes three protection layers. Education and training
is a layer already used in protection from traditional phishing. For ATD, we
recommend email receivers to scrutinize the email content for sharp changes in
the tone of the email and seek out-of-band email verification thorough phone
call, face-to-face interaction, or asking others about the sender’s recent behavior.
Another layer that is used in traditional phishing is automated detection
[47]. The automated detection is specific to the ATD strategy used - for the one
we tested it requires linguistic politeness checks of incoming and outgoing email.
This might prove ineffective in some cases, so we propose a third layer of defense.
Identifying a change in linguistic politeness requires a measurement of existing
linguistic politeness, something we call Individual Sensitivity Footprint or ISF.
ISF works by identifying unique features of linguistic style for email senders
from their past emails. Analogous to an anti-virus or anti-malware protection a
software employing ISF checks would scan incoming email for linguistic polite-
ness and then compare the use of each individual’s linguistic politeness against
their established ISF to detect any change, which might be a result of an active
ATD attack. This is a conceptual prototype and we are fully aware that it is far
from practical realization, but we want to illuminate any future research that
wants to explore ATD countermeasures in addition to new ATD vectors.
A fully functioning ATD attack would require far more finesse to remain
in the ambience. Artificial intelligence, particularly as it has been developed to
allow ”ambience” could be employed to enable the ATD malware to keep track of
conversations, allowing for a bidirectional, or even multidirectional ATD attack
(cc-ed emails, for example). ATD could function across multiple accounts and
devices, limited only by the ability of the adversaries to gain and hold man-in-
the-middle positions for each device or communication vector. However, given
the processing speed of contemporary computers and improvements in AI that
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can edit still images, video, and sound, as well as the increase in the amount of
time people spend experiencing reality via some form of computer mediation,
we believe ATD in future can be employed beyond simple manipulation of text.
We can imagine a future in which an ATD attack changed the reality a victim
perceived through ”smart glasses” or ”smart contacts.” The ATD concept holds
across any computer-mediated reality and the ATD threat grows to the degree
people trust what the see, hear, feel, and perceive from any source that has
passed through a computer of some sort.
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